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Abstract: The drafting process of the EU Global Strategy published in June 2016 
has differed distinctively from the formulation of the European Security Strategy 
in 2003 mainly because of its consultative character. The coordination of the pro-
cess was ensured by the High Representative who brokered between interests of 
individual Member States. Looking through the lens of deliberative intergovern-
mentalism, the paper examines patterns and channels of the cooperation between 
Poland and the EEAS throughout the strategy-making process. It attempts to 
shed light on the officially repeated claims on the Member States’ ownership of 
the document and their active participation in the consultations. The article ar-
gues that only with national diplomacies as strategy-makers, the document would 
have a chance to enhance the EU’s ‘will to project power’ in its neighbourhood 
and beyond. However, the salience of the new strategy among the high political 
level in the Member States reveals to be crucial for a sustainable contribution to 
the deliberative policy formulation. 
Keywords: EU Global Strategy; High Representative; Member States, European Ex-
ternal Action Service; deliberative intergovernmentalism, EU’s foreign policy 
1 The author is very grateful to the referees for their helpful comments and wishes to ack-




After the European Council commissioned the High Representative for Foreign Af-
fairs and Security Policy (HR) in December 2013 with the task of developing a new 
strategic vision for the EU´s external action (European Council 2013), a heated debate 
about both the need for a new sense of direction for European foreign and security 
policy and the substance of the strategic document has started (Ciesluk-Grajewski, 
2015, 2016 & 2016a). The need for a new strategic document was pressing since the 
previous one, the European Security Strategy (ESS), was formulated in 2003. The 
fundamental threats for the EU’s security identified over a decade ago such as terror-
ism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, states failure and 
organised crime still remain significant. However, they have evolved and became ever 
more disruptive causing further dangers. The challenge for the new Global Strategy 
on Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union (EUGS) lies not only in 
a sober assessment of dangers, but primarily in answering the questions how to use 
the instruments at the EU disposal and how to operationalize the strategic vision in 
an effective way. Already the ESS aimed at a better coordination across various ac-
tors and instruments in defining and executing EU´s foreign policy interests but the 
delivery was lacking (Becher, 2004).
Considering the fact that the authority on the scope and character of the political 
aspects of the EU’s external action as well as about recourses and instruments to 
be used lies in the hands of the Member States, their political will is curial for the 
operationalization of the EUGS. Against this backdrop, the underlying assumption for 
this paper is the importance of the engagement of the Member States in the drafting 
process of the new strategy. The sense of ownership among the national diplomacies 
over the strategic vision could contribute to the development of political will to act 
externally and to the provision of national resources which are necessary for bringing 
the document into action. However, as this analysis will show being involved is not 
enough and it needs political salience and will from the highest political level to get 
involved actively and shape the drafting process sustainably. If the Member States 
stand back of the strategic vision, there is a chance to tackle the key challenge of EU’s 
foreign policy-making: the persistent problem of reconciling the continuing capac-
ity for national foreign policymaking with the declared aspiration and an evolving 
infrastructure, for a common and effective EU’s external actions. 
The overarching question of this paper is to what extent the Member States have 
engaged in the drafting process of the EUGS and how the consultation process 
between them and the EU level have looked like. This contribution focuses on Poland 
as one of the most ambitious foreign policy players (Szczerbiak, 2012, p. 40 – 107; 
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Buras, 2015). As such, it should be, by default, greatly interested in promoting its 
priorities to the European level and in fostering political and military dimension of 
EU’s external action by a joint and substantive strategic document. Following the 
logic of the EU’s integrative purpose, which implies that process often matters as 
much as the output, the paper focuses on the process and not on the content of the 
final outcome. Thus, it looks on both the patterns and channels of cooperation with 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) and HR – Frederica Mogherini on 
the strategy as well as the up-loading mechanisms of Polish national interests to the 
drafting process. 
This article is structured as follows. Succeeding section reflects on theoretical 
approaches which can be useful while investigating the participation of the Member 
States in the drafting process. Next, the innovations of the EUGS drafting process will 
be outlined and the analysis of the Polish case follows. In the conclusion I return to the 
overarching question on the involvement of the Member States in the strategy-making 
process and reflect on the potential of this particular institutional environment to 
foster policy deliberation. 
With regard to date and sources, the article is based on documents (non-papers) 
delivered by the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the HR and to Nathalie 
Tocci, special advisor to the HR on the EUGS as well as on secondary literature on 
EU strategy. In order to provide better understanding of the Polish engagement in 
the drafting process, I conducted anonymous semi-structured interviews with officials 
from the Polish MFA and with proven experts in this field2. I also had the opportunity 
to speak with Sir Robert Cooper, the Director General of General Secretariat of the 
EU’s Council who was one of the authors of the previous security strategy. Moreover, 
I took part in five seminars that were organized within the consultation process of 
the EUGS in Germany, Finland and Poland and talked to EEAS officials involved 
in the drafting. 
Theoretical Remarks
Institutional innovations brought by the Treaty of Lisbon to the EU’s foreign policy 
institutional framework have not changed the main obstacles for enhanced external 
role of the EU – the divergent policy preferences among different stakeholders such as 
Member States, EEAS, European Commission, and European Parliament. Hence, the 
2  In order to maintain the anonymity of the interviewer, the author presents only the positions 
of the interlocutors and the data of the interview. The full list of interviewers is in the possession 
of the author. 
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process of reaching a consensus between the Member States who oppose the qualified 
majority voting (QMV) and between them and EU’s institutions with regard to the 
priorities of the EU’s external action remains crucial. A quick review of the literature 
reveals several distinct theoretical models which can be used to investigate process of 
achieving a collective definition of diplomatic objectives among EU’s foreign policy 
stakeholders. The models include intergovernmentalism with veto threats, norma-
tive institutionalism with cooperative bargaining and entrapment, constructivist and 
sociological institutionalism with elements of elite socialization, Europeanization and 
collective identity formation. 
A particularly inspirational approach for studying the relationship between the 
Member States and the EEAS during the strategy-making process is offered by new 
intergovernmentalism framework (Bickerton, Hodson & Puetter, 2015). Drawing 
on the integration paradox (EU countries pursue more integration but resist further 
supranationalism) the new intergovernmentalism implies the post-Maastricht tendency 
to delegate power to de novo bodies rather than traditional supranational institutions. 
The EEAS is an example of such a de novo body as it comprises elements of both the 
intergovernmental and supranational decision-making. The operationalisation of this 
approach proposed by the authors of this theoretical model, enables one to prove the 
arrival of the new intergovernmentalism in the current state of the European integra-
tion by looking at recent developments in various policy areas (Bickerton, Hodson & 
Puetter, 2015a). Since this paper takes the existing institutional framework in EU’s 
foreign policy as a starting point and goes beyond it by investigating the dynamics 
of the interplay between the de novo institution – the EEAS and the Member States, 
this approach is not directly applicable here. 
However, one of the main categories on which the new intergovernmentalism 
draws upon is the deliberative process of policy formation. The concept of deliberative 
intergovernmentalism traces back to the democratic theory and was first adapted to 
the EU studies by Eriksen (2000). Policy deliberation is considered to be a condition 
for successful EU policy-making both during the course of policy formation and 
its initial adoption and in all phases of the policy cycles (Puetter, 2012, p. 164). So 
far, this approach was mainly used to examine the processes in the Council and the 
European Council where the Member States have the lead. The prime example is 
offered by the consensus over the Eurozone crisis which was forged by Chancellor 
Merkel. This paper presents the approach in a slightly different light in order to assess 
the drafting process of EUGS. Once commissioned by European Council with the 
task of delivering a new strategy, HR decided to try a working method which has been 
not used before in formulation of strategic documents within EU’s foreign policy. She 
opened up the process for extensive consultations with various actors in the Member 
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States and with other EU’s foreign policy stakeholders such as think tanks, academia 
and non-governmental organisations: “We needed to hear the views of experts, of 
academia and of policy makers. But we also needed to hear the view of the broader 
foreign policy community and of all who have a stake in it – that is, all Europeans” 
(Mogherini, 2016). 
According to the existing literature, the deliberative intergovernmentalism states 
that the appropriateness and legitimacy of policy decisions are derived from a reasoned 
consensus and open discourse. As Puetter puts it “deliberative intergovernmentalism 
provides an analytical framework for assessing institutional adjustment and chang-
ing coordination practices with regard to their respective deliberative quality. It is 
expected that deliberative processes evolve depending on the negotiation setting 
and the policy content discussed. Those settings which function as informal forums 
for policy dialogue are considered to be particularly conducive to deliberation. (…) 
As regards the content, it is expected that deliberative processes are fostered when 
actors interpret policy challenges as common problems and/or have to decide under 
uncertainty” (Puetter, 2012, p. 166). The consultation process of the new strategic 
document seems to correspond well with the conditions of the deliberative intergov-
ernmentalism - joint authority and control over the process of both the Member States 
and Mogherini’s drafting team, the shared wish of making the EU’s external action 
stronger and more coherent as well as great uncertainty about the developments in 
the strategic environment of the Union. 
The idea of this paper is to assess to what extent the consultation process between 
the EEAS drafting team and the Member States (based on the Polish case) can serve 
as an example for a variation of deliberative intergovernmentalism. Hence, in the 
case study I look for traces of joint control over the strategy-making of the national 
diplomacies and the HR, as well as I examine the institutional features of the negotia-
tion setting in terms of its potential for development of policy deliberation. 
Towards the EU Global Strategy 
After Mogherini was appointed as a successor of Catherine Ashton, the formulation of 
the EUGS has become one of the most comprehensive challenges, she had to deal with. 
The expectations from different stakeholders towards both the process and the outcome 
were high. Mogherini undertook the task with strong determination making foreign 
policy experts believe that she wishes to build her legacy over the new strategy. 
There are several factors that distinguish the development of the ESS and the 
formulation of the EUGS. First of all, the external circumstances of the process 
differed. The ESS published by Javier Solana, HR for Common Foreign and Security 
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Policy (CFSP) was not a formal strategic vision as the term is commonly understood. 
Robert Cooper, who helped Solana to formulate this document, admitted that it was 
not their aim to deliver a strategy but rather a form of sticking plaster for the EU’s 
Member States to help cover their own differences after the division over Iraq. With 
regard to the motives expressed in December 2013 by European Council which invited 
the HR to access the impact of changes in the global environment, they were based 
on two main factors (European Council, 2013). The first one was the emergence of 
new security challenges such as cyber threats, maritime security concerns and energy 
security (European Council, 2013, p. 4). The second factor was the willingness of 
the European Council to explore the opportunities for increasing the effectiveness 
and impact of EU’s foreign and security policy which were offered by the Treaty of 
Lisbon (European Council, 2013, p. 2). 
Another difference lies in the organization of the drafting process and in aiming 
to include the Member States’ views. Mogherini has proceeded in a two steps. 
First, in accordance to the mandate from the European Council, she drafted an 
assessment of EU’s global security environment which was presented in June 2015 
(EEAS, 2015). Then, after approving the review by the European Council, the 
drafting process of the EUGS has started. As Cooper noticed: “This is being done 
very differently now, and I think that is right. Mrs Mogherini seems to have created 
quite elaborate structures for debate and involving the national Governments all 
along (…). If you want to produce big changes in a big lumbering institution, you 
need to build up a consensus within the Member States and the institution itself, 
and you do that by having the debate” (Cooper, 2015). Opposite to that, the ESS 
was put in writing by first and foremost Solana and Cooper who consulted their 
ideas with other EU’s foreign policy stakeholders but not in such a comprehensive 
way (Andersson et al., 2011, p. 18 – 20). The process proposed by Mogherini was 
open to national capitals, other European institutions and civil society via think 
tanks community. Within the expert outreach and consultation process that was 
initiated in October 2015 and run until April 2016, 38 seminars and workshops on 
EU’s external relations took place across the EU countries. Both national ministries 
for foreign affairs and think tank communities were actively involved in organising 
these events in cooperation with the EEAS. Moreover, over 50 papers written by 
academics and experts from all around the world were delivered to the EU Institute 
for Security Studies which coordinated the outreach process (EUISS, 2016). The 
final outcome of the process is the strategy which is much more comprehensive in 
scope and rich in detail than the ESS. 
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Involvement of the Member States. The Polish Case 
Already during the membership negotiations with the EU, Poland has tried to leave 
its footprints on the EU’s foreign policy and focused mainly on the promotion of 
Polish ideas for the Eastern dimension of the neighbourhood policy (Pomorska, 2007, 
p. 36 – 42; Kowal, 2015, p. 34 – 350). In 2009, Warsaw succeeded in proposing the 
idea of Eastern Partnership which was officially announced as EU’s regional approach 
towards Eastern neighbours. With time Poland has become an active player in the 
EU’s foreign policy not only with regard to the East but also in defence matters and 
democracy promotion (Kaminska, 2014; Sus, 2014; Janning, 2016). This allows as-
suming that the country would be deeply interested and engaged in the formulation 
process of the EUGS. To examine this assumption both patterns and channels of 
cooperation with the EEAS and topic-oriented contribution will be analysed. 
Patterns and Channels of Communication 
The main communication channel between Polish diplomatic service and the drafting 
team was the National Contact Point (NCP) in the Polish MFA, within the Depart-
ment for Strategic Planning. Polish representatives have been meeting the officials 
from the drafting team almost every month during the writing process and discussed 
different aspects of the strategy. According to the literature on the conditions for 
policy deliberation (Puetter, 2012, p. 165), such an intensive and frequent dialogue 
increases the potential of policy deliberation to develop since it offers room for inter-
active interventions and honest conversation. In addition to that, the document has 
been also regularly discussed at the level of ambassadors at COREPER and Political 
and Security Committee (PSC) as well as at the level of ministers at Foreign Affairs 
Council. Mogherini also discussed the Global Strategy with foreign affairs and defence 
ministers at the informal Council meeting (along the informal Gymnich formula) in 
Amsterdam in February 2016. 
Polish officials from the MFA expressed their admiration for the hard work of the 
drafting team in keeping the Member States in the loop and taking their contributions 
into consideration. At the same time they communicated their regrets about limited 
possibilities to discuss the aspects of the strategy in a wider spectrum of countries and 
would prefer to have more discussions between the NCPs from different countries. To 
compensate this shortage, Polish MFA took part in consultations within the Visegrad 
Group which resulted in a common declaration for stronger Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP) (Visegrad Group, 2015). 
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Apart from the consultations between EEAS and the NPC, Polish MFA contrib-
uted to the drafting process via three non-papers: one with solely Polish perspective 
(MFA, 2016), one joint paper of the V4 countries (MFA, 2016a) and one joint paper 
with Denmark, Rumania and Sweden (MFA, 2016b) as well as via questionnaire 
prepared by the drafting team and filled out by the NCP. In all documents a particular 
relevance of three topics was clearly defined and would be presented below.
Topics of Interests 
From the Polish perspective, the EUGS should push for the revived multilateralism 
by drawing on existing institutions such as UN and OSCE and to defend the interna-
tional order based on rule of justice as well as on the responsible behaviour by using 
all instruments at the disposal of the EU and the Member States: military, civilian and 
law capabilities. More specifically Polish proposal emphasized the importance of three 
particular areas: CSFP and its security dimension of CSDP, transatlantic partnership 
and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
With regard to the first topic, Polish security community was rather disappointed 
about the broader security concept introduced by Mogherini and wanted the strategy 
to be more focused on the further enhancement of CSDP. Poland proposed to explore 
the possibility to use Union budget for certain defence-related expenditures, to support 
the competitiveness of the European defence industry and to link the CSDP with 
other internal and external policies, mainly with the ENP. Special attention was also 
devoted to the ability of the EU to counter the hybrid threats which “can rapidly 
evolve into hybrid warfare” (MFA, 2016, p.2).
As far as the cooperation between the EU and the US is concerned, two Polish 
priorities were completion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) and the enhancement of the coordination in planning and synergies develop-
ment at the operational level between the Union and NATO. Polish MFA stressed 
that in 2015 only Poland, Estonia, Greece and the UK met the NATO commitment 
to spend 2% of their GDP on defence. Meeting the goal by other EU member of the 
Alliance would be very welcome from the Polish point of view and would contribute 
to the strengthening of the defence capabilities of the Union.
Regarding the ENP, the strategy should first and foremost focus on supporting 
the stabilization and prosperity of the neighbouring countries both in the East and in 
the South (MFA, 2016a, p. 3 – 4). At the same time Poland expressed its hope that the 
new strategy will reaffirm the EU’s commitment to enlargement policy and to future 
membership for all Western Balkan countries. From the Polish perspective the EU 
is not a global security provider but should focus on being a security provider in its 
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neighbourhood what is a prerequisite for EU’s capacity to act globally. Effective EU’s 
external action towards the wider neighbourhood, must be supported by clear political 
will and exercise of action by Member States. The EUGS should therefore prioritise 
the deepening of political association and economic integration with countries seeking 
close ties with the EU such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. With regard to this 
particular point, officials from the Polish MFA stressed the difficulties to make the 
importance of the Eastern neighbours visible due to the great dominance of tradition-
ally Southern oriented Italians within the drafting team3. My interlocutors have wished 
the composition of the team would be more balanced in terms of country of origins. 
Nonetheless, Warsaw has joined forces with Denmark, Rumania and Sweden and 
proposed in a non-paper the reinforcement of the EaP as “an effective instrument of 
the EUGS” (MFA, 2016b). 
Despite the fact, that the communication between NCP in Warsaw and the drafting 
team was intense and that Poland has contributed to the strategy via three non-papers, 
most of the interlocutors emphasized the rather reluctant position of the high-level 
officials within the Polish government towards the strategy. While the presence of 
the political leadership in the deliberation process is crucial (Puetter, 2012, p. 165), 
Polish high-ranking diplomats seemed to take a ‘wait and see’ attitude and were not 
particularly interested in neither the process nor the outcome. In the view of most 
interlocutors, the reluctant position was caused by limited belief that the HR is powerful 
enough to take a lead and make the 28 national leaders to carry on the EUGS. As 
Solana once put it: “All we need is the political will” (2009) and there seems to be very 
little belief within Polish government in the willingness of the Member States to further 
enhance the EU’s external actions. As one interviewer said “now we have an appropriate 
institutional framework with double-hatted HR and EEAS but due to the lack of 
will to act in some Member States, the EU might be not capable to deliver a strategy, 
which could be operationalized”. Some of the interlocutors expressed their doubt 
whether the EUGS will not be overshadowed with other topics such as Brexit, which 
indeed happened at the summit of the European Council in June 2016 (Winneker, 
2016). Another reason of the rather passive attitude of Polish high-level diplomacy in 
the strategy-making process was the anticipation that the language of the strategy will 
remain very general in order to include as many interests expressed by the Member 
States as possible. The officials from the MFA reported only a few controversies at the 
stage of drafting precisely because of the general language. The discussion over the 
3 Apart from Frederica Mogherini and Nathalie Tocci, also Antonio Missiroli, the director of 
the EU ISS which played a central role in the EUGS outreach process as well as Alfredo Conte, 
the head of the strategic planning division in EEAS were Italian.
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essential details was postponed to the sub-strategies which can become an object of 
a much more intensive struggles among the Member States (and the EU institutions) 
than the EUGS. Furthermore, despite it was not directly mentioned by any of the 
interlocutors and the interviews took place before and after Polish parliamentary elec-
tions in October 2015, one can assume that the internal concerns overshadowed the 
foreign policy issues and contributed to the limited interest for the EUGS. However, 
since the analysis of the change in the foreign policy priorities and instruments after 
the parliamentary elections would overrun the scope of this paper, it will not be further 
investigated here. Irrespective of the reasons, the strategy-making process has not 
proliferated up to the highest level of decision-making in Poland. In fact, contrary to 
the questions of economic governance during the euro crisis, it was not on the agenda 
of the EU’s highest political institution – the European Council. 
Conclusions
The idea of this paper was to trace the involvement of the Member States in the 
strategy-making (based on the Polish case study) and to assess to what extent the 
consultation process can serve as an example for a variation of deliberative intergov-
ernmentalism. 
With regard to the first issue, the analysis shows a mixed picture. On one hand, 
the NCPs as a communication channel with the drafting team as well as the pos-
sibility to contribute to the text via non-papers were much appreciated, even though 
a more intensive debate among Member States (or at least in a groups of some of 
them) came too short. But on the other hand, both officials from the MFA and 
experts reported limited interest for the EUGS within high-level decision-makers 
due to the reasons presented above. There was no public debate about priorities for 
the EU’s foreign policy at the national level. This disinterest partly explains the very 
weak participations of Polish think tank community in the outreach process of the 
EUGS. Only one seminar was organised by Polish Institute of International Affairs 
(PISM) and none of the leading Polish think tanks contributed to the written outreach 
process carried out by EUISS. This is quite surprising given the fact that PISM was 
involved in a significant project on the development of a European Global Strategy 
in 2012 – 2013 (EGS, 2013). Asked for the reasons for the non-participation, think 
tank experts admitted to rather follow the agenda of the MFA and defence ministry 
and to focus on the NATO summit and issues linked to the defence capacities taking 
into account the precarious situation in Ukraine.
As far as question on the EUGS drafting process as an example of a deliberative 
intergovernmentalism is concerned, one of the main prerequisites of the model seems 
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to be missing - the involvement of highest political level. The consultation process 
took part mainly between the drafting team and lower level bureaucrats (NCPs and 
policy planning units in national ministries for foreign affairs, PSC) whereas the 
senior level of EU’s foreign policy making – the national leaders within the European 
Council had not devote greater attention to both the process and the content. Either 
the strategic review of the security environment presented by Mogherini in June 
2015 or the final text of the EUGS was subjects of discussion within the European 
Council. The EUGS was ‘welcomed’ by the heads of states and governments who 
invited the HR together with the European Commission and the Council to take the 
work forward (European Council, 2016). It can be understood as a strong call for 
follow-up action but the assessment of the operationalization of the strategic vision 
is currently premature. So far, the actors who exercise political leadership and enjoy 
the decision-making competence within the political aspects of EU’s external relations 
were mainly absent in the process what made the shared authority and joint control 
over the EUGS drafting process unfeasible. One could risk the assumption that the 
issue at stake – the formulation of the EU’s strategic vision was not significant enough 
for the national leaders to get involved into deliberation process. The EUGS was not 
expected to be a biding document and to be ‘adapted’ by the national leaders in the 
European Council who “waved it through and then moved on” (Techau, 2016). In 
sum, the strategy-making process does not offer a good example of a deliberative 
process of policy formation. However, taking into account that in October 2016 
the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on the EUGS and started 
herewith the implementation process, the deliberative process of decision-making 
might take place during the operationalization of the strategy. The Member States’ 
participation is indispensable for the process. 
Concluding the analysis, it is to be noted, that the involvement of Polish high-
level diplomacy as well as security community in the process seems to be limited and 
so is assumedly the ownership over the document. Polish Foreign Minister Witold 
Waszczykowski referred to the announcement of the EUGS in the light of Brexit as 
“pointless”(Waszczykowski, 2016). The consequences of this development for the EU’s 
foreign policy remain. Yet, the single case does not allow generalizing its findings. 
An investigation of the participation of other countries in the strategy-making would 
be needed in order to deliver a more comprehensive picture which would allow to 
verify the official claims on “Member States’ ownership and involvement throughout 
the process” (Council of the European Union, 2016, p. 2). So far, as the Polish case 
shows the opportunities and expectations of drafting process in terms of bringing 
more coherence to the EU’s foreign policy and enhancing its will to project power 
could be difficult to accomplish. 
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